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In the face of obdurate social, educational, and political failures, problems, and
obstacles, Boston University persists in its management of the Chelsea public
schools. It also persists in its refusal to share power with such Chelsea citizenry
as the resistant Latinos whose leadership the university seeks to discredit. Jacobs
examines the historical background of the city and its schools to decipher Chelsea's
economic dependency and repeated fall into receivership and privatization.
Since 1989 the nation has watched an educational reform unprecedented in
boldness and scope — nothing less than the privatization of management of
the complete urban school system in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Chelsea, a tattered in-
dustrial suburb of Boston largely framed by vice, corruption, and poverty, is a place
where nary a week passes without a sordid news report of police and official corrup-
tion, robbery, murder, abduction, bookmaking, racketeering, and prostitution. Indeed,
even a progressive psychiatrist and community activist who has spent a decade work-
ing in Chelsea has described the life of the poor of this city in similar terms:
Being trapped in an environment of intense affect surrounding an increased fre-
quency of events . . . describes life in Chelsea. The people there seem to suffer
an endless sequence of things. Fires, accidents, crimes, illness, moving, job loss,
pregnancy, marriage, divorce, birth, death — hardly has the person recovered
from one wave of change than another comes along. . . . The pattern of adverse
life events ... is not experienced as a sequence of waves so much as a whirlpool. 1
Lately, boasts of miracles in the making by caretakers from outside have sought
to modify the sordid image. There is the widely publicized resurrection of Chelsea's
fiscal solvency — with strong infusions of state and state-related aid — by the city's
receivers, and there is Boston University, which, for more than four years, has under-
taken complete management and reformation of Chelsea's schools. On the other
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hand, obscured in the media is the mobilization of Chelsea's minority population,
especially its Latinos, in response to the privatization of its schools.
"Why is Boston University still in Chelsea?" in one sense belabors the obvious.
Of course, Boston University remains in Chelsea because the terms of the contract
signed with the city in 1989, which also exempts the university from some of the
strictures encumbering public bodies, specify a ten-year commitment for the univer-
sity to run the schools. Nonetheless, in a city so mired in structural problems eman-
ating from national economic and political forces — not to mention the ineptitude,
corruption, and mismanagement in pathetic little Chelsea — any party attempting
comprehensive educational reform might be doomed to failure.
Rumors have circulated that members of the management team and other univer-
sity officials privately admit that Chelsea is a sinkhole that is bleeding the university
of resources. It has been said that perhaps the only reasons why Boston University
has stayed in Chelsea are the stubborn pride and political ambition of John Silber.
Were it not for these — and the opportunity to be the impresario over Chelsea's $92
million school-building project — rumor has it that Boston University would move
out lock, stock, and barrel. As we shall see, Silber's pride and ambition belie a more
complex institutional modus vivendi.
The absence of significant program achievement by the Chelsea project, coupled
with Chelsea's acute fiscal crisis and fall into receivership in 1991-1992, also fueled
rumors of Boston University's evacuation. Nevertheless, the university's public de-
meanor has been one of staunch perseverance, and its spokespeople waste no time in
proudly proclaiming that "we didn't back away" from fiscal catastrophe. In its 1992
report to the Massachusetts legislature, the university explained away poor test scores
and teacher absenteeism as products of stretched resources. Moreover, it predicted
vastly improved test scores for grades three, six, and nine on full completion of the
project's preschool program by entire student cohorts. 2 A September 6, 1992, New
York Times article suggested that reading and math scores, the drop-out rate, and
teacher absenteeism remained virtually the same as when the university took up man-
agement of the schools. Yet Boston University and its president are loath to admit
failure where more prudent parties would at least register a modicum of self-doubt.
To rescue a city's schools from a laundry list of educational and social maladies is
a Promethean task. It is no surprise that such an undertaking would be attempted by
John Silber and his university. Having ridden herd over his own university through
methods of corporate control for more than a decade and a half, finagling a large uni-
versity budget for entrepreneurial purposes with a collusive covey of trustees and
playing the urban real estate game with the aid of a former Boston mayor, Silber at
last had a chance to actualize a dream held even longer than the span of his exploits
at Boston University: to have complete control and influence over the minds of a
community's children.
Thus, the murky question of why Boston University remains in Chelsea resolves
to the matter of how it pursues its agenda there. Silber, through his pride, his and his
university's ambition to mold a community and its schoolchildren, and the unwilling-
ness to admit defeat after so much of the university's resources have been invested,
bespeak a kind of collective cognitive dissonance not unlike the persistence of a
more powerful nation's costly aggressive intervention in the affairs of a small poor
country. Popular resistance to the more powerful party's presence is met with rigidity,
intransigent incomprehension of the "ingratitude" of the "natives," and outright hostil-
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ity. This, indeed, is the posture typifying the university's community relations. But it
is only part of the story. The coming of both Boston University and receivership to
Chelsea fits a historical pattern of many older "dependent" cities in the United States.
I examine the Boston University/Chelsea project as a point along the trajectory of
Chelsea's social history. It is clear that Boston University and the receivership are
simply successors to caretakers in Chelsea's past. Moreover, the university manage-
ment team's modus operandi and community relations are significant telling points of
the paternalism evinced by a university refusing to acknowledge a client population
as social and political equals. The story of the community's resistance to the incur-
sion of private interests into the public realm comprises a case study of the object
lessons of privatization. In discussing the "politics of information" of the project —
the university's reluctance to evaluate itself and its cynical use of data derived from
it — I show how privatization intrinsically walls itself off from openness and ac-
countability. In this case, an expose by a Latino community organization remained
the sole safeguard for the public's right to know. This incident and the larger struggle
for Chelsea's schools hold important implications for cities steadily forced into the
maw of privatization.
Chelsea's History: Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves in One Century
Chelsea's history has spanned a trajectory from old-style urban machine politics
through receivership of the city government by a Control Committee following a
devastating fire in 1908 and a subsequent return to its patronage and graft-prone sys-
tem in 1911, to a "leveraged" takeover of its schools by a private — "nonprofit" —
corporation in 1989, and a full circle return to receivership in fall 1991. The dynamic
in motion here represents social, economic, and political factors that have operated
both locally and nationally to make Chelsea dependent.
By the 1860s Chelsea's Protestant "old settler" families and colonial heritage were
being eclipsed by immigrants, first, around 1875, from the British Isles, then, after
1890, southern and Eastern European immigrants, with Russian Jews being — and
remaining for many decades — the most numerous, with smaller admixtures of
Poles, Italians, French Canadians, Slavs, and other groups leavening the ethnic mix. 3
As Edward Kopf informs us, "By the early twentieth century, Chelsea was not
merely a specialized section of the larger metropolis [i.e., Boston].4 It was, rather, a
comprehensive industrial suburb, encompassing all of the virtues and defects, all of
the classes and activities, of a fully developed urban area." 5
A fire in 1908, the third largest in the history of the nation,6 destroyed about 40
percent of the city and served as a historical precedent7 for privatized management
of Chelsea's affairs because the city had to be virtually rebuilt — public buildings,
residences, businesses, and most of its infrastructure. The business establishment —
local manufacturers, bankers, and professionals from Boston — organized relief, con-
vened, and promoted the placement of the city into virtual receivership by suspend-
ing its aldermanic/mayoral government and vesting governing authority in the hands
of a Board of Control for three years. Testimony at public hearings called to discuss
petitioning the state for suspension of the regular city government and formation
of the Control Committee was prescient for the Boston University question eighty
years later. Clearly, confidence in and by the business community was considered
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the most valuable asset in rebuilding the city, as reported in a May 3, 1908, Chelsea
Gazette article.
We must have the best men possible to restore confidence. ... It is necessary
to restore confidence, both in the people and in those who have been forced
out . . . and what is much more important, the confidence in financial men in
the future of that city. We have got to have large amounts of money poured into
the city to rebuild it.
The graft-fraught and patronage-ridden local government was derided. As William
E. McClintock, future chairman of the Chelsea Board of Control, was to put it two
years later in a retrospective New England Magazine article, 8 "After the fire there
was a widespread feeling that the city could not be quickly and economically rebuilt
and remodeled by the Mayor and the Aldermen."9
The Mugwumpish "old [white Protestant] settlers," who had guided Chelsea's
early growth and resisted annexation by Boston in the previous century, had their
second chance for supreme control. 10 Clearly, then as now, the caretakers of the city
saw crisis as an opportunity to solve problems that representative — immigrant-
saturated — government had allowed to get out of hand.
More popularly based, that is, ethnic-working-class, opinion, then as now stressed
local self-reliance and the importance of safeguarding the franchise of voters. In a
city hearing on the commission question, "Enthusiastic Meeting" in the Chelsea
Gazette of May 9, 1908, a Mr. Doherty, who in conformity with the prejudices of
the day was portrayed as an Irish rustic, adumbrated later popular views concerning
privatization in Chelsea.
"What we want to know about this commission is, what good is it going to be for
the city of Chelsea? What authority will it have? Will we have any guarantee that
they will govern our city any better than our present government has? Will the
city of Chelsea have to pay the bills? I guess so. If the city of Chelsea is going to
pay the bills they ought to have the right to say who is going to spend the money.
If the money lenders won't lend the money, what guarantee will you have that
they will lend it to the commission?"
Mr. Doherty's questions have been succeeded by contemporary ones coming from
quarters also viewed as naive and, alternately, as obstructive and nonrepresentative of
the community. Driven by their anxieties and aspirations, the business elite were con-
vinced that the problems might be solved if the "best people" governed once more.
After all, a precedent had been set by the installation of the first city commission in
Galveston after its 1901 flood. However, as Kopf points out, "To the immigrants,
commission government was not reform; it was disenfranchisement." Ironically, one
of the results of the fire was an expansion of the immigrant component of Chelsea's
population. The fire prompted the desertion of the city by many of the "natives"
(white Protestants). "By 1915 the numbers of aliens and their offspring had increased
to 140 percent of their 1905 levels. Immigrants and their children constituted two-
thirds of Chelsea's people in 1905; this proportion had increased to 84 percent in
1915, just seven years after the Fire." 11
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At the Vanguard: Chelsea Schools Pioneer ESL Instruction
Research on Chelsea's public school history indicates that "immigrants arriving in
the period 1890 to 1930 found a school system similar in structure to the one we
know today, but one . . . which did not expect to retain all students even through the
end of 9th grade." 12 Earlier, virtually all of Chelsea's immigrant population was Eng-
lish speaking, but a threshold was crossed with the second and larger wave of Poles,
Russian Jews, Italians, Lithuanians, Armenians, French Canadians, and others. Be-
tween 1890 and 1925, coterminous with this wave, the population of children of com-
pulsory school age grew threefold, from 4,445 to 13,019.
In other words, a qualitative transformation emerged from the increase in numbers
and diversity of Chelsea's immigrants. The "schools recognized this diversity largely
as an issue of language," 13 and from 1890 on the increased diversity of the city and
student body prompted revision of the "terms of incorporation" — a revision of
school policy regarding the education of immigrant children. Non-English-speaking
students were sent to ungraded classes in the primary school until they acquired suffi-
cient linguistic ability to be mainstreamed. Called the Non-English-Speaking Depart-
ment, these special classes functioned as an intensive English as a second language
(ESL) program.
Far from being characterized as intolerant, one scholar tells us, "the 'sink or
swim' submersion approach was regarded as the only or best possible arrangement
for English acquisition." Nevertheless, the tendency toward experimentation concern-
ing incorporation of the linguistically different into the schools was "limited and
conditioned by the overriding concerns with crowding." Just as noteworthy was
Chelsea's reluctance to respond to state mandates regarding truancy and vocational
training programs. 14
What is to be learned from all of this? We are informed that on the one hand,
"Chelsea's educators showed a willingness to experiment and creativity within, or
as a result of, the constraints imposed by limited resources. The 'special classes'
afforded more concentrated attention by teachers and were a departure from a very
standardized norm." 15 On the other hand, these efforts were sabotaged by the school
committee's noncompliance with state mandates. The contradiction, however, is
only superficial.
Chelsea's industry until the late 1950s was largely owned by Chelsea or Boston-
area residents. In a small city there was no question about the congruency of private
with civic interests. Since it was in the factory owners' interest to have available an
ample, minimally educated, compliant local labor force, in the spirit and practice of
the times it was standard assumption that the school life of non-English-speaking stu-
dents would be short, that is, it would not continue after they reached the age of four-
teen, when attendance was no longer compulsory. Most high school-age students
were destined to work, "an option that was perhaps less desirable in 1890 than it had
been in 1850, but which remained more acceptable in 1890 than it is in 1990." 16
The contradiction for that time was between the goodwill of the teaching corps
toward their polyglot charges and the constraint of limited resources within a context
specifying limited schooling for the city's children. This was constituted by the rela-
tions — between workers and employers — of production in Chelsea, which de-
manded exactly what was given educationally and remained true and was reinforced
following the 1908 fire.
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Entering the Vestibule of Dependency
Massive immigration ended with the restrictive laws of 1921 and 1924, essentially
stabilizing the composition of Chelsea's population through the 1950s. During 1930—
1954, the local press conveyed an image of the schools congruent with Mark Peter-
son's. Overcrowding appears to be a perennial issue, but a dissonant note concerning
the physical obsolescence of the schools and of the school system intruded in the
1950s. Glimmers of an impending crisis appeared but are never acknowledged as
such until the 1970s.
What prompted this apprehension? Perhaps it was the shock to the city and its im-
age evoked by the building of the Mystic-Tobin Bridge, a long, elevated eyesore
completed in 1951, which bisected the city and obliterated some of its old neighbor-
hoods. The bridge, later to be a flaking-lead-paint nightmare, was, like so many other
urban renewal projects, selfishly conceived as a quick way to the North Shore for
more affluent suburbanites. Also, the good fit between the school system and the
city's economy and political structure began to unravel. With the white European
population commencing its trek out of Chelsea — there no longer being an industrial
base to employ them — the school board was faced with an obsolete system, but
with few resources or ideas on how to change it. Indeed, the city was about to be
left stranded — a familiar story for most older industrial cities beleaguered by
capital flight.
Thus a Harvard Graduate School of Education field study of the schools, Chelsea,
the City and Its Challenge, is a significant document. Commissioned in 1954 by
Mayor Andrew Quigley, it was published in an interregnum of the city's having
passed its industrial heyday and its white population on the verge of leaving. 17 The
report, a glossy prospectus for school rebuilding and reform, sounds a prophetically
ominous opening note.
A living city is a visible sign of great common purpose. When cities are alive, the
most advanced art, powers, and standards of civilization flower in them. A collec-
tion of people no longer mobilizing their powers to create civilized values beyond
those previously attained marks a declining city. 18
Having underscored the necessity of replacing much of the physical plant, the
document notes that nearly one-half of the Chelsea teachers were employed before
1935 and turnover was quite low. Judging by the results of a questionnaire submitted
to teachers, it "was difficult to find any agreement among the Chelsea staff as to
what the objectives of the Chelsea school system are"
19 This anomie certainly speaks
to the obsolescence of the Chelsea school system. An incredulous tone pervades the
report, which decries the city's inertia in its toleration of such an anachronism. The
handwriting was on the wall in the 1950s; in the 1970s it would be replaced by the
graffiti of urban decline.
The invocation of Harvard in 1954 and Boston University in 1985 bespeaks Chel-
sea's propensity toward dependence. Mayor Quigley was exercising an old reflex —
calling in the experts — that served as a dress rehearsal for Boston University's entry
three decades later. Reprivatization of the management of the city's affairs structur-
ally and functionally reflects cycles of uneven growth and episodes of economic retar-
dation that have come to typify the urban landscape of the United States. 20 It is an
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inclination typifying our society's predilection for associating success with individual-
ized effort in the pursuit of profit.
Enter Boston University: Reprivatizing Chelsea
The Boston University/Chelsea project grew out of the 1985 request of school com-
mittee member (also former mayor, state representative, senator, and publisher of the
Chelsea Record) Andrew Quigley to John Silber for Boston University to manage
the Chelsea schools after the city of Boston refused Silber's offer. Claiming that the
Boston system resembled a 747 without control panels, Silber managed to alienate
the Boston School Committee with his offer of strong management. Boston School
Committee president John Nucci's rejection anticipated later criticisms of the univer-
sity's top-down management style and privatization of the Chelsea schools. After
quarreling with the encumbrance of Silber's estimated per pupil cost on the Boston
school budget, Nucci took up
the final and most important flaw in Dr. Silber's proposal — the lack of account-
ability to the residents of the city. Silber boasts almost frighteningly that he could
run the schools free of "political pressures." In my opinion this is a clever way of
proposing capricious management, without any degree of responsiveness to, or
access by, those paying for and affected by the system. Without the accountability
that is demanded of elected officials, the result would [be] an insensitive and
even greater bureaucracy than now exists. With all due respect to a fine institu-
tion, Boston University, under Dr. Silber's guidance, has not exactly been a model
of sensitivity and concern for its neighboring community and the city-at-large. 21
[Italics added.]
According to a May 3, 1990, interview with its dean, George McGurn, the School
of Management, not the School of Education, initiated the project, because U.S. busi-
ness was worried about "our global competitiveness and schools of education were
part of the problem." Moreover, they desired "a broad spectrum on management's
impact on society. The university's criticism of the Chelsea schools in its 1988 report
was a response to the schools' substandard educational conditions, viewing the city
and its school system as a hollow entity without extant viable leadership or an ade-
quate social and political substrate to sustain an adequate civic school culture. This
assessment reflected the management school's and President Silber's business-ori-
ented disdain of national and local educational conditions.
Boston University's report on the Chelsea public schools, "A Model for Excel-
lence in Urban Education," underscored the Latino community's isolation and aliena-
tion. The report noted that parents felt excluded from their children's education by
virtue of strained communications between the families and their schools and the
parents' "inability to feel in control" and concluded,
Lack of community support and parental involvement in the schools is a wide-
spread problem, but is particularly noticeable in Chelsea's Hispanic and Asian
communities. Most teachers, administrators, and other white elites ascribe the
problem to apathy, disinterest, and cultural barriers. The minority leaders we
have talked with, however, place the problem along class and racial lines. With
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anecdotal evidence, they argue that their constituents have been denied access to
government, schools, jobs, housing, health care, and other community institutions.
It added that efforts to mobilize support for minority candidates failed "due to frac-
tured alliances, lack of money, and the inability to overcome competing interests with
common concerns," but wrongly predicted, "It is unlikely that these minority groups
could effectuate change through the political process, even if they could coalesce"22
Boston University's assessment of Latino isolation and alienation was not matched
in its stewardship of the public schools by a foretelling of the politicization of Lati-
nos, nor by sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of the Latino community. The
report context was shaped by an agenda of managerial control of the schools, and per-
haps of social services and community development. In short, juxtaposed with the
university's responses to Latinos and Latino and non-Latino agencies and organiza-
tions, the report can be viewed as a kind of manifesto in the service of community
manipulation.
The university's dealings with the Hispanic community are detailed further below,
but examples of the university's posture of engulfment and occupation toward the
community and its agencies starkly contrast with a more supportive role that might
have been taken. One case, concerning small day care providers, which came before
the Chelsea Executive Advisory Committee (CEAC) on February 25, 1991, and the
State Oversight Panel on March 12, 1991, illustrates Boston University's opportunis-
tic mien. Representatives from local day care programs, which rely on grant money,
came to those meetings to complain that Boston University, planning programs of its
own despite its promises of accommodation and compromise, was ignoring the local
centers and appeared to be going ahead with plans to seek funding via grants. A sec-
ond case concerns Choice Thru Education, which for more than two decades has ad-
ministered Upward Bound and other high school supplementation programs in the
city. It was about to apply for federal Talent Search funds for Chelsea in 1991 when
it was learned from Boston's Hispanic Office of Planning and Evaluation that HOPE
was also applying for this grant to operate Talent Search in Chelsea. Superintendent
Diane Lam had bypassed Choice and gone to HOPE to support its bid for the project.
When representatives from both agencies learned of these facts, HOPE pulled its
grant application on the grounds that it would be unethical to compete with a Chelsea
agency that was qualified to run Talent Search.
These cases illustrate an institutional reflex of opportunism as opposed to a seek-
ing of common ground, a posture which, even when reined in because of protest, is
predaceous. Such insensitive community relations and the imperviousness of the city
government to Latino needs and interests earlier prompted Latinos to elect their first
public official, school committee member Marta Rosa, in 1989.
The management team's operating style would reflect the earlier stance of the
Chelsea project's planners. As noted, the would-be caretakers, initially invited into
Chelsea as consultants, saw the city and its school committee and administrative com-
plement as bereft of educational resources. (Information gleaned from interviews
with Dean George McGurn and Chris Allen on May 3, 1990, and Robert Sperber on
April 27 and May 11, 1990.)
Adherence to this premise prompted Boston University's insistence on nearly abso-
lute contractual authority in its management arrangement with Chelsea. As education
school dean Peter Greer put it in a February 16, 1990, interview, "We were going to
186
take all the risks. Why shouldn't we have full control?" The sentiment is identical to
Dean McGurn's earlier pronouncement, '"We want the control, the responsibility and
the accountability, and that's what management is all about.'"23 Presumably, wanting
the accountability meant control of information and immunity from disclosure. Early
project manager Chris Allen's recollection is that after looking at the school commit-
tee, there was no foundation to build upon: only a small number of administrators in
the school system were committed to change, and among the teaching ranks "there
was little on an organizational level — no cohesive group you could point to and say
this is a model to build upon" (interview, May 30, 1990). Dean McGurn, alluding to
a pantheon of urban problems, observed, '"Chelsea is on top of every list you don't
want to be on"'24 and, delivering a back-handed compliment, exclaimed, "The bril-
liant thing about Chelsea ... is they recognize failure when they see it, even if
they're responsible.'"25
The approach taken by BU was hierarchical, that is, top-down and emphasizing
complete control of the school system's finances and personnel. What is more, it
would never vary appreciably. It would seem as if Chelsea's Lilliputian size (1.86
square miles) tempted management school Dean McGurn to exclaim (interview, May
3, 1990), "It was so small you could wrap your arms around it. It was microcosmic.
Frankly, if you were to take over the Boston system, who would ever know?" Such
paternalism verged on pathos when McGurn stated, "We have to remember that
Boston University is larger than the population of Chelsea. We can't be like Lennie
in John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men, who breaks the neck of a mouse."26
John Silber's Mission: A City of One's Own
Clearly this was to be no "experiment," as it has often been loosely characterized. It
is a project initiated with the conviction of the university, its president, and all who
have administered it that it would be a precedent-setting solution to the ills of urban
education. "I hope to change the national view on education," Silber is quoted as
saying. 27 The BU report asserts: "Boston University is willing ... to assume the
authority and responsibility to assure that Chelsea's public schools become a national
model of urban education." 28 The goals of the project thus transcend education, as
management team members Carole Greenes and Peter Greer suggest when they stress
that "the moral climate of a school has an effect on learning," and that "character for-
mation will be stressed and civic virtue reaffirmed."29 This is closely aligned with
John Silber's emphasis on combining education with heroic ideals. That civic virtue
might be conceived differently by Latinos and other dissenters has been anathema to
Boston University. This speaks to the question of why there is a complete absence
of university-sponsored evaluation of the Chelsea project: such paternalism cannot
countenance criticism, constructive or otherwise. I later detail the significance of this
vis-a-vis the manner in which the project and its representatives deal with evaluation,
research, and information.
For Silber the project is the actualization of a vision of wider social reform con-
ceived in the 1960s when his "Proposal for a Measure Attacking Poverty at Its
Source" was entered in the Congressional Record?® A program for preschool educa-
tion, it contained the premise that "children born into Negro families and families
whose native language is other than English [read Latinos] are not sufficiently
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stimulated verbally or are insufficiently trained in English to compete successfully
in the public school whose programs are designed for English-speaking children."
The proposal provided for education "of mothers of slum children," schools in "reno-
vated slum houses," tutoring, remedial summer schools, and, presciently, "a massive
crash program in one or two communities of a moderate size." 31 Not only would
Silber and his university have the opportunity to run "a massive crash program," but
in Chelsea they would actualize Silber's dream of early childhood training with a pre-
school program.
The Latino Struggle to Be Heard
When the Hispanics joined the debate over the city's prospective contract with
Boston University, the legitimacy of their participation was denied. In the school
committee's deliberations over the impending contract in 1988, Latinos were largely
absent from public hearings, but in early 1989 they turned out in force. They con-
tended that little information had been disseminated to the Latino community in
English or Spanish and that the Latino leadership was ignored by the school commit-
tee, aldermen, mayor, and PTA. 32 In February the Hispanic Commission wrote to
Boston University management team chair Peter Greer, "We, the Hispanic popula-
tion, have been neglected. Considering that over 50% of the school population is His-
panic we should have direct input into the proposed plans."
This is not surprising in the context of race relations in our society. The charge of
repressive invisibility reverberates more widely than its metaphorical imagery when
one considers the stereotypical and selective media treatment of and Anglo elites'
denial of the representativeness of minority leadership. Hence, the simplistic asser-
tion that the contract issue had been aired in the Chelsea Record for some time beg-
ged the question, since the Record's long-exhibited antipathy to Latinos, whom it
depicted stereotypically, encouraged civic apathy in the community. Moreover,
Chelsea Latinos made headlines only in the Record's police report; community and
individual achievements went largely unreported. 33
As for the city government's attempt to communicate, there was no felt need to do
so. No wonder that the March 1989 imbroglio at the final School Committee hearing,
after the placid hearings of July through November 1988, came as a shock to Chel-
sea's Anglos. It was as if it had come ex nihilo. Who would have expected a pariah
population to become civic minded, particularly over such stereotypically Anglo con-
cerns as education?
Therefore the belated activism on the part of the Latinos was the end of an era of
political submersion. The Latinos' late entrance into the public forum is perceived by
proponents of the contract as forfeiture of the Hispanics' prerogative to participate in
the public debate. Implicit in this denial is a judgment of the Latinos' competence
and right to participate. Hence, their clamor to be heard has been perceived by the
pro-BU forces not as a will to democratic participation but as obstructiveness. How
could such tunnel vision accommodate the stirrings of a minority community for self-
determination? Mayor John J. Brennan, Jr., the late Andrew Quigley, Alderwoman
Marilyn Portnoy, and Rosemarie Carlisle, president of the PTO, among others I have
interviewed, echo the sentiment that "[Latinos] had their chance" and flubbed it by
their belated entrance into the arena. Boston University's bestowal of the mantle of
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invisibility, as we shall see, has been to cast the Latino activists as obstructive impos-
tors and to insist on the color blindness of their praxis.
A typical response was that of Rosemary Carlisle, Quigley's replacement on
the school committee, who has now been reelected. When asked if she thought that
Hispanics have been excluded from the process of installing the contract, she briskly
replied,
Hispanics were never excluded — and I don't know where you got that informa-
tion. They had all the rights as I did as a citizen of Chelsea to be active in the
BU partnership. ... I attended numerous open meetings, I went to the state
house. I was aware of the contract and of the problems that were in the contract
and I voiced my opinion, so the Hispanic community were never deleted from
any of it as far as I'm concerned.
When I asked, "Why do you think they were so upset at the time?" she answered,
Because they came in too late in the process. If they had come out when Boston
University first came here a year and a half ago and kept on track on top [sic] of
everything, they would have been able to voice their opinion like all of the other
citizens. I have no idea why it took them so long to voice their opinions. They
should have voiced them earlier like we [i.e., the rest of the community] did.
(Interview, April 10, 1989)
She denies that racism and exclusion have been the lot of minorities in Chelsea,
and when I questioned her on why the PTO is devoid of Hispanics, blacks, and Cam-
bodians, she blankly said she didn't know. This point of view articulates well the mo-
tivation of many who, in and out of city government, welcomed Boston University
into Chelsea largely as a remedy for the incipient dilution of white dominance and
the chronic fiscal embarrassment of the city. Thus, accusing the Hispanic activists of
being Johnny-come-latelies is emblematic of a rhetoric of exclusion, as if to say "Bet-
ter never than late!"
What is/are the agenda(s) of the supporters of Boston University's "experiment"?
As we know, the lineaments of Chelsea's school system, originally designed to pro-
vide limited education for its first- and second-generation immigrant factory labor, in-
cluding intensive ESL instruction, had not changed appreciably for better than a half
century. By the 1970s urban "blight," the depletion of its industry and more mobile
white populations, had made inroads into all Chelsea's public institutions, and by the
mid-1980s the "boodle" had run out for Chelsea's patronage-driven city govern-
ment. 34 The school system, originally designed to prepare a white ethnic working
class for local industrial employment, in tandem with the other municipal institutions,
could be said to have been in crisis, but this "crisis" had been going on for more
than a decade, when in 1985 Boston University's president, John Silber, was asked
to intervene.
The real crisis was that of the white-dominated political machine and its voter
base, which was threatened by a burgeoning Latino and Southeast Asian population.
Hence the crisis may more usefully be seen as a "moral panic" wherein a cry for help
was issued to Chelsea's new great white hope for gentrification and dilution of its mi-
nority population. 35 In other words, "crisis" is a term, like "terrorism," that serves as
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a mordant for the facticity of the status quo and its "natural" enemies. In this case,
the natural enemy of the city is blight, which is incarnated by the perception of threat-
ened whites in minorities and in the run-down neighborhoods where they are forced
to live. One antidote for urban decline may be conceived as "whitening" or gentrifica-
tion. As Mayor Brennan explained (interview, January 22, 1990),
All of your middle-class middle-aged people are going . . . There's no more
children of the white middle class. That's what I honestly see. I think with BU
here and a new school that we hope to build, I believe then that we'll draw
people in a financial bracket that can pay for a good home and not be able to
pay for private schools.
After he had rattled off a list of changing Boston neighborhoods whose refugees
might make good prospects as Chelsea residents, I asked, "What about blacks and
Hispanics?" He replied, "Oh yeah, and them too." Thus the halcyon dream of Chel-
sea's earlier white working class for middle-class respectability would now, it was
hoped, be vouchsafed in the postindustrial age.
As for the growing minority populations, their invisibility had beome trans-
mogrified into the blur of an advancing wave of color and culture, which could be
stemmed only by forceful intervention, in this case, in the school system. On the
other hand, with renewed vigor, a larger population, and a new crop of young lead-
ers, Chelsea Latinos would find in the school question all the material they needed to
launch a revitalized organization and an electoral campaign destined to change the
contours of Latino politics. As James O'Connor says, crisis is "social struggle and.
reintegration" and the "greater the threat from emerging centers of power . . . the
greater the resistance thrown up by the old."36
The Transformation of Latino Leadership
Marta Rosa, president of Chelsea's Commission on Hispanic Affairs and member of
the Chelsea School Committee, recalled (interview, February 8, 1990) that 1988 and
1989 were watershed years for the commission, for they mark a kind of "changing of
the guard of the Latino leadership." It was a time when people were ready for new
leadership and more influence on civic affairs. Her recollection was that there were
many veteran activists on the commission.
People who had been around a long time, had worked in the community with . . .
different organizations — LUCHA and Comite Latinamericano, people who had
given a lot already . . . They wanted to be involved but were really burnt [out] at
the time. A core group of those people, people like Ceferino, Elma Richard, Pat
Vega, stayed with the commission . . . Aperfcia Rodriguez . . . These are people
who had been working in the community for years . . . When I was in high school
these people were working. People were ready for something.
Marta Rosa hadn't been an activist long enough to be burned out, so when she and
others such as Juan Vega came along, new blood blended with the old and reinvigo-
rated activism in the city.
Prior to this, Chelsea Latinos had attempted for more than a decade to secure a
foothold in the city's civil service and political affairs. A variety of organizations,
represented by moderate figures, emphasized accommodation to the white Demo-
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cratic leadership of the city. In the 1970s through the mid-1980s confrontational
groups such as LUCHA found themselves beleaguered and neutralized by hostility
and harassment from City Hall. 37 The Hispanic Commission, initially chartered under
Mayor Nolan in 1987, was an accommodationist group, but as noted, the events of
1989, including the hiring of a Puerto Rican community organizer by the teachers un-
ion to stimulate Latinos to support an opposition school committee slate to Boston
University, succeeded in transforming the organization into an autonomous activist
one. 38
The year 1989 also was important because of the confluence of events surround-
ing Chelsea's contract with Boston University and the commission's alliance with
Multicultural Educational Training and Advocacy (META), an organization that had
achieved national recognition for its advocacy work with linguistic minorities. Marta
Rosa became acquainted with META through Felix Arroyo, a prominent Puerto Rican
educational activist — later, a Boston School Committee member — who suggested
a meeting with the Chelsea Teachers Union. At that meeting toward the end of Janu-
ary 1989, she encountered Javier Colon, a META lawyer, and several meetings en-
sued between the two organizations (Rosa interview, February 8, 1990).
Collaterally, as this popular group became allied with META, so did Boston Uni-
versity receive succor from the conservative New England Legal Foundation, which
joined the legal battle presumably to determine the constitutional constraints of the
case.
39 As the conflict grew more intense, the commission found itself casting an eye
toward elective office. To accomplish this the Latino electorate had to be aroused.
Voter registration would be required.
Voter registration added grit — toughness and tension — to the process of ac-
quainting Latinos with their prospective representatives and themselves. It became
an important agent of politicization in the community. Resistance was high within
and outside the Hispanic orbit, but it provided a current for change agents to work
with: pushing it here, guiding it there, and navigating its currents to achieve greater
empowerment.
Angel ("Tito") Rosa, Marta's husband, organized the voter registration drive. The
election of Marta Rosa in 1989, among a slate of Chelsea School Committee candi-
dates cosponsored by the Chelsea Commission on Hispanic Affairs, the Chelsea
Teachers Union, and its parent the American Federation of Teachers, evidently repre-
sented a victory for a popular front against the long arm of privatization and white su-
premacy. It fits an emergent trend in the evolution of Latino politics: the appearance
of autonomous grassroots leaders.40 Lyn Meza, a veteran Chelsea activist who served
as Marta Rosa's campaign manager in the 1989 and 1991 elections, noted that the
time was ripe for change (interview, April 24, 1990). Meza could not refuse Rosa's
request that she manage the election campaign because "this was something that we
had been waiting for, working for, hoping for years in this community — for respon-
sible leadership to develop."
The Politics of the Revolving Door
I have suggested that Boston University employs a "revolving door" strategy of
community relations, typifying the manner in which dominant power holders seek to
manipulate minority group organizations. When minority leaders or other autono-
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mous community representatives do not fall into line with majority group strategies,
they are discredited as not being truly representative of their constituencies. Majority
leaders and caretakers then threaten to work around these "false" leaders, that is, to
work with the "true" community.41 Boston University did this when the Chelsea Ex-
ecutive Advisory Committee (CEAC), a mandated body, showed signs of independent
thinking in 1990: Peter Greer accused CEAC of pretending to be "another school
committee" and threatened to "work around" that body.
Boston University is chagrined at the resistance put up by Latino community repre-
sentatives; when it cannot control them it strives to discredit them and support other
leaders it considers more worthy. In 1991 the management team strove to insinuate
itself into the Latino community by offering blandishments to El Centro Hispano and
frequently alluded to its harmonious relations with El Centro when the issue of the
team's poor record of community relations was publicly raised. El Centra's current
director, Jose Fernandez, has been trying to navigate an autonomous course for the or-
ganization and has assiduously steered it away from the shoals of internecine conflict
while resisting the seductions of the university to render material aid and other sup-
port. More recently, the university, with the aid of a former El Centro board member,
sponsored a Latin American festival committee. Previous festival committees have
put on beauty pageants; the activities and operations of these organizations typically
have been riddled with conflict over the use of funds. Unfortunately, this is the best
the university can do with its community relations.
While election of minority leaders is a source of strength and pride to these
groups, it is a threat to established interests. In an Education Week article, Peter
Greer complained about citizen groups in Chelsea who "see the university's presence
as a grand opportunity to gain power — even at the expense of students" through a
"vote counting back door."42 Marta Rosa had already been elected (November 1989)
and the innuendo concerning a "vote counting back door" implied that her election
somehow was underhanded — sub rosa, as it were!
The management team has insisted from the outset that the community was
wasting its time demanding inclusion instead of allowing the team to carry on its
business. During the contract dispute of spring 1989, the commission and META
attempted to carry on negotiations with Boston University on bilingual education,
parent participation, and other matters. The university would relay signals of willing-
ness to talk and then balk. Finally, in April 1989, it issued a memorandum saying,
"The University is unable to make agreements on behalf of the Chelsea school depart-
ment until the University is officially managing the Chelsea schools on behalf of
the Chelsea School Committee."43 The university never again showed willingness to
negotiate with the community.
Thereafter the university intoned a "troublemaker" theme, casting the Hispanic
leadership as obstructionist. At the height of debate over the contract, an Education
Week article quoted Greer as saying, "The Hispanic community happened to gear up
at an untimely moment — the very moment when the agreement was about to be
signed." While Greer thought that it was "really healthy" that Latinos were forming
to fight for education, he preferred "to see them expend their energies on implement-
ing the project rather than trying to hold it up."44
Only one month earlier President Silber had accused the discontented Latinos
of being manipulated by the Chelsea Teachers Union, implying they lacked the
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autonomy and judgment to act on their own.45 In a press release issued the same
day, March 31, 1989, the Hispanic Commission had asserted that Silber's accusation
was insensitive and that their dissent was based on "legitimate concerns regarding
bilingual education in the proposed early childhood program and with the level of
parent involvement in the implementation of the B.U. plan." Rather than manipula-
tion, concern about the quality of education of Hispanic children and respect for
cultural identity prompted the Latinos' outcry.46
Almost a year later the accusation of obstructiveness and opportunism would be
leveled again, this time in response to Chelsea activist Tito Meza's charge that Silber
was making premature and false claims about the project's success in his guber-
natorial campaign propaganda and that the project was an exercise in government
by secrecy. A diatribe from Greer, in the BU student Daily Free Press asserted, "I
don't really take that criticism seriously. . . . The Hispanic leaders are just trying to
get more power, and I think it is totally unfair to use John Silber as a means to gain
power." Moreover, claiming color blindness, Greer asserted, "Our view is that
students are students, not Hispanics, whites, or blacks." He criticized the Hispanic
leaders for wanting a majority of members on the CEAC "because the council is
supposed to represent all of the groups in Chelsea . . . not just the Hispanics." There-
fore, "Instead of fighting, we decided to work with the people through other groups
and simply bypass the leaders."47 The fatuity of this statement lies in its smug pre-
sumption of both the university's awareness of the community's needs and the con-
gruity of the university's and community's goals.
The university's aggrandizement of power obviates the pursuit of an enlightened
community relations policy. An example is its hiring in 1989 of a Hispanic superin-
tendent of the Chelsea schools, Diana Lam, which was intended to score points
with the Latino population. Lam would need all the courage and risk taking she prof-
fered for the job, for she was not welcomed with open arms by Chelsea's Latinos.
Claiming to run an open superintendency, she acquired a reputation for stubbornness
and resistance to unsolicited community input that marked her as a Boston University
functionary. At the end of January 1990, intending to forge a consensus, Lam con-
vened a meeting with the Latino leadership. However, she became evasive and
defensive at the leaders' insistence that she respect their grievances with the univer-
sity, with the result that the boundaries remained drawn as before. A disappointed
Lam lamented, "It looks like what we're going to get out of this meeting is another
meeting" (my notes, January 24, 25, 1990). Having already been reprimanded by Bos-
ton University vice president Westling for her voiced admiration of Nelson Mandela
at a school assembly, Diana Lam, no matter how competent and feisty she seemed,
was structurally compromised. She was, after all, the university's employee and
throughout her stay, until the spring of 1991, when she announced her ill-fated candi-
dacy for the mayoralty of Boston, she walked a tightrope.48
While the dissent of an ethnic minority offers the most dramatic case of the univer-
sity's intolerance, other examples offer compelling evidence of the dangers of circum-
venting public control of education. Recently, at the urging of the receiver, Harry
Spence, attempts were made by Boston University to revive the inactive Chelsea
Executive Advisory Committee. CEAC was created under the terms of the contract
to provide advisory input on educational policy by representatives of community
constituencies. Throughout CEAC's history the university intimidated its chair — un-
der the aegis of assisting in defining the body's proper "role and responsibilities" —
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patronized it as a group, and failed to provide timely information and documentation
on school system policy changes and program developments. The most recent at-
tempts at resuscitation appear deadlocked, with the university resisting at every turn
the coexistence of critical opinions of groups such as the Hispanic Commission. It
appears that even criticism coming from the quarters of a "mock parliament" such
as CEAC will not be countenanced by the management team. What with the dialogue
comprising a series of "retreats" guided by a BU-funded facilitator, attempts are be-
ing made to finagle a consensus. Some constituents feel this violates the spirit and
original intent of CEAC: Why shouldn't opinions vary — even if disagreeable — and
accurately represent the diversity of public opinion about the schools in Chelsea?49
The Politics of Information and the Chelsea Project
In the social sciences, questions concerning the treatment of research subjects and
the uses to which data are put are customarily posed under the rubric "research
ethics."
50 In universities, self-study — the gathering of data pertaining to a school's
institutional activities and the like — comes under the heading "institutional re-
search." However, when the academy engages in educational or social reform, it
is doubly imperative that it engage in self-study and submit to outside evaluation.
A crucial aspect of any alteration of institutional arrangements is the manner in
which knowledge about the new configuration is gathered and disseminated and the
uses to which such knowledge is put. Assessment must be made concerning which
social and political interests benefit from such knowledge. Appraisal of the ethics of
knowledge gathering and evaluation becomes a sine qua non, since not only are the
safety and confidentiality of "research subjects" at stake, but that of the public inter-
est is as well. When there is a tendency to overlook, deny, conceal, and even distort
findings for the (frequently manipulative) purposes and interests of the reformers, the
validity of the project and the ethics and legitimacy of the managers are called into
question. As noted earlier, the Boston University Chelsea Project has tended to avoid
evaluation, preferring to elevate the loftiness of its own and the university president's
goals over any qualifications raised about results.
When educational expertise operates in the social world, it must be subject to the
same constraints that guide other public policy. If educational reform in the name
of the public is otherwise immune to public review, it is accountable only to the
"experts" sponsoring it. Where then are the safeguards against the malpractice of the
managers when the experts and managers are the same? Thus, the absence of a self-
study component cast a shadow on an otherwise exemplary Chelsea program project,
the Early Learning Center, which had suffered with problems — poor supervision,
lack of a curriculum, unsanitary facility, overcrowding — requiring replacement of
its director. Asked by a reporter how its operations were evaluated, John Silber, who
loudly touted the center during his campaign for the governorship, baldly replied,
"By just going in there and watching those children." Silber's exclamation made it
appear as if his judgment was synonymous with common sense! 51
Accusations would be leveled against the management team at a spring 1992 joint
meeting of that body and the Chelsea School Committee that a highly strained school
budget had disproportionately allocated moneys to the showcased preschool program,
much to the neglect of older students' needs. The sacrifice was defended by manage-
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ment team strategist Robert Sperber as an important priority in which "somebody's
got to lose."
52 Here we see the interrelatedness of the issues of public accountability
and evaluation. One suffers in the absence of the other; both can brake the excesses
of expertise and the vanity, pride, and ambition of institutions and institutional care-
takers. For Boston University, the administrative imprimatur suffices to underwrite
the quality of the project and its programs. Evaluation studies are not viewed as
necessary or useful. At other times the management team has simply deferred the
task of evaluation to outside agencies. During the controversial preliminary period of
approval for the contract, Peter Greer said that the need to hire an outside evaluator
of the project was critical,53 but the university has never sponsored evaluation from
within or outside the Chelsea project. The State Oversight Panel has continually
underscored the need for evaluation. At the panel meeting/hearing in Chelsea on
December 12, 1990, after the management team made their presentation, including
a turnout of uniformed members of the Chelsea High School rowing team, panel
member John T. Dunlop dryly commented,
Someday down the road somebody in the state or federal government is going
to write this story. Was it good, or how good, and I regret to say, whether you
like it or not, putting together a set of numbers is going to be a large part of the
story. There ought to be one or two people developing indices on a time series
basis. . . . One of these days somebody's going to want to look back and measure
the change. I would feel more comfortable if somebody was devoting some time
to do that. I know one or two people in your establishment is competent to do
that. (Notes, December 10, 1990)
In response to this statement, Superintendent Lam said, "I think you're absolutely
right that we need a data base, and with the limited resources we have, I can't prom-
ise you that." She added that Pelavin Associates, an outside consulting firm hired by
the federal government to evaluate the Chelsea project, were setting up a data base.
Panel member Irwin Blumer responded by inquiring about the university's role in ac-
quiring quantitative data and requested that the management team devote time at the
next panel session to answering that query. Lam went on to excuse the lack of such
data on technical grounds, because there had been no computerization of records
prior to the coming of BU. (Notes, December 10, 1990)
At a January 26, 1993, session of the State Oversight Panel in Chelsea, Blumer
reiterated the "need to get into quantitative evaluation to determine if you're meeting
your goals," noting that this was one of two cardinal concerns, the second being pub-
lic access (notes, January 26, 1993). At the oversight panel hearing on June 11, 1993,
Blumer's request for quantitative evaluation of the project was once again met with
silence. Thus, it is clear that the call for evaluation is still a cry in the wilderness.
Superintendent Lam's allusion to Pelavin Associates is noteworthy. Presumably,
objectivity would have been vouchsafed, until we learn that Pelavin Associates and
its proprietor, Sol H. Pelavin, served the Reagan administration and its secretary of
education, William Bennett, by helping to "hatchet" bilingual education by writing
reports critical of bilingual programs and of research on such programs. 54 It is a
well-known fact that management team chair Peter Greer served as an undersecretary
to William Bennett before coming to Boston University and the Chelsea project. Also
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widely known is John Silber's hostility to bilingual education. 55 Here such an "objec-
tive" evaluation implies collusion.
In a city where more than 65 percent of the public school students are Latino
(54.5%) and Asian (11.9%), Chelsea's educational caretakers' stance toward scientific
appraisal of this "experiment" gives one pause as to the real possibility of achieving
an objective evaluation of the Chelsea project. Moreover, it points toward a collusive
alliance against the interests of linguistic minorities and their children.
Timing Out Chelsea Parents
But this constitutes only a portion of the problems concerning the politics of informa-
tion and the Chelsea project. Another cause for consternation is what happens when
the project and its acolytes carry out research on the project and programs connected
with it. Such is the case of the "Tuning In to Chelsea Parents" survey carried out in
May 1990 and reported in the press six months later.
Commissioned by the superintendent of Chelsea schools Diana Lam, the survey
was conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Responsive Education, with its
research design and data analysis subcontracted to the Boston Urban Research and
Development Group headed by Yohel Camayd-Freixas, a former researcher for the
Boston public schools.
The survey was designed to assess respondents' perceptions of the schools and
program needs through a wide variety of checkoff items under the general rubrics of
community needs, school effectiveness, and family health. Opinions and preferences
were solicited regarding actual and desired parent participation in school activities
and home learning, attractiveness of school programs, for example, affecting school
choice, effectiveness of school-home communications, and so on. Included with the
survey was a "Parents' Confidential Report Card on the Schools," asking parents
to "grade" the Chelsea public schools on discipline, physical condition, books and
materials, curriculum, safety, homework, written communications, drop-out preven-
tion, tutoring, opportunity for parent involvement, teacher and teaching quality,
performance of administrators, and performance of the superintendent.
Based on a stratified — by ethnicity and race — random sample of 466 parents,
388 interviews were completed. These were done through door-to-door and telephone
interviews conducted either in English or the respondent's native language, Spanish,
Vietnamese, or Khmer. While the survey report's opening pages assert, "Overall, the
degree of certainty in the accuracy of the survey for the entire population is quite
high," the report's appendix and other related documents tell quite a different story.56
Appendix A of the report, comprising survey methodology, indicates that "three of
the five major racial-ethnic groups in Chelsea, the Latino, Black, and Vietnamese
communities fell below critical research targets." The percentage of Latino sample
households not reached — almost half— was significantly greater than for others,
which averaged 41.75 percent. Moreover, "and more importantly, respondents in the
Latino community were skewed towards those easier to reach." Thus, while the re-
search protocol required field-workers to make three attempts to telephone poll re-
spondents, "this protocol [sic] was not followed." Of the total sample of 388, 71
homes received only one or two calls. Latino households comprised 82 percent of
these cases, hence undersampling "the harder-to-reach households, which may tend
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to underrepresent more recent immigrants, the poorest families, or those in greater
need of support." 57 As the Institute for Responsive Education survey report admits,
"Of the 72 home visits to Latino households required by the sample plan, only 15
(21%) were conducted because of time limitations. This bias can be expected to com-
pound the bias identified above."
This error was compounded by the fact that Latino families without telephones
were undersampled. The survey's data base contained 1,721 Latino children, 11 per-
cent of whom lived in households without telephones. Moreover, the service of 23
percent of the Latino households with listed telephones had been disconnected at the
time of the poll. 58 Given that 36 percent of all Latino households in Chelsea have no
phone or disconnected service, "this suggests a bias towards those Latino families in
higher than average socio-economic classes."59
In view of these errors, the report concludes, 'The resulting Latino survey sample
is biased beyond the control of statistical adjustments." Moreover, "these data, then,
do not represent the views of the lowest socio-economic segments of Latino families
in Chelsea. As a result, no statistical analysis or inference may be drawn beyond
descriptive considerations."60 These are quotes from the introduction to the section
entitled "Field Work Bias," a compendium of preliminary findings submitted to the
Institute for Responsive Education by the Boston Urban Research and Development
Group a month earlier. 61
Thus, sampling bias, unrepresentativeness, and invalidity of the survey's data
were clearly acknowledged. This did not deter Boston University and Diana Lam
from releasing the results of the survey to the press. On December 11, 1990, a
Boston Globe headline read, "Chelsea Schools Please Parents."62 Carefully omitting
Latino responses and the disclaimer regarding the flawed sampling and unrepresenta-
tiveness of the data for Chelsea's ethnic groups, the article reported the results from
the "Report Card" section of the survey, noting that "70 percent of the parents ques-
tioned gave the school system an 'A' or a 'B,' and only 2 percent gave the system a
failing grade. Cambodian parents were most satisfied with the schools, while whites
and blacks said they wanted more from the schools."63
The report also qualified the validity of the "Report Card on the Schools" survey,
since it was based on volunteered parental responses and was "non-scientifically
administered" and "therefore . . . statistically suggestive, rather than predictive, in
nature." Hence, "the data are not meant to be generalized at all."64 The Globe article
did not convey these qualifications but reported a generally positive and valid paren-
tal evaluation of the schools and of the Chelsea project.
Members of the Hispanic Commission were outraged at this presumption of unani-
mous community approval verging on fraudulent use of the survey. In view of the
intense and lengthy struggle to make their concerns heard, their leaders recognized,
and to deflect the nearly constant stream of abuse spewed by Boston University at
dissenters, the Hispanic Commission had their turn to embarrass the management
team. Strategy sessions were held, at which it was decided to go to the press.
Muriel Cohen, the Boston Globe's educational columnist who had issued the origi-
nal laudatory story on the survey, was telephoned. She said that her article was based
on information provided by Superintendent Lam. Of course, Cohen also had a copy
of the survey with its methodological appendix warning of the invalid data, but the
unquestioned legitimacy of the project and its functionaries often has served as a
vaccine against the truth. It is no wonder that Cohen did not sift through the report
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before accepting the received wisdom of Superintendent Lam's and Peter Greer's
glowing testimonials. Cohen promised to send a reporter to get the commission's
side of the story and hear its rejoinder.
Also contacted were the Gaston Institute for Latino Community Development
and Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts Boston, the Institute for Respon-
sive Education, and Seth Racusen of the Boston Urban Research and Development
Group. The Gaston Institute, after reviewing the survey report, sent a letter to Daniel
Viggiani at the Hispanic Commission essentially summarizing the list of defects re-
ported above. 65 Don Davies, director of the Institute for Responsive Education (IRE),
which is housed on the BU campus, was telephoned and insisted that the report was
honest in owning up to its defects and, furthermore, that the institute's integrity was
not at issue.
Davies claimed that the institute was an autonomous organization unbeholden to
the university. Nonetheless, Davies was a member of the Boston University education
faculty and dissertation advisor to Diana Lam. How independent could the IRE be
in this case? Seth Racusen, a research associate at the Boston Urban Research and
Development Group, was appalled by the egregious flaunting of the survey data quali-
fications his organization had attached to its report to the IRE. In a letter to the
Globe editor summarizing the data's defects, he concluded, "On a project whose con-
tent concerns Boston University, this institute is not an 'independent' research organi-
zation, as the Globe article claimed."66
The Hispanic Commission issued a press release on December 21, 1990, outlining
the survey's defects. The release said, "The use to which this questionable informa-
tion has been put seriously compromises the credibility of the entire project and
speaks poorly of the BU Management Team's professionalism." Moreover, it raised
questions concerning the aforementioned conflict of interests of the Institute for
Responsive Education and accused the university of contriving the appearance of
popular consensus about the Chelsea project in the shadow of a State Oversight
Panel's criticism of the university's high-handed treatment of the community. It
concluded: "Chelsea's Latino community has long borne testimony to concerns about
the BU Management Team's presumption, arrogance and willful disregard of commu-
nity sentiment. We resent this further encroachment on the autonomy of Chelsea's
Latino population."67
Shortly afterward the Hispanic Commission spoke with a Boston Globe reporter
who wrote a detailed article rectifying the mistakes of the previous piece. In it
both Superintendent Lam and IRE director Don Davies acknowledged "some statis-
tical problems with the survey," but said, "the findings were never meant to be
construed scientifically and should be used for informational purposes only." What
"informational purposes" meant was not clarified. If Diana Lam's excuses for such
distortion were to be taken as a definition, namely, "'Research wasn't the end. . . .
Changing the practices of the school and the community were the end,'" then collu-
sive manipulation of public opinion using the trappings of science is the most plausi-
ble interpretation left open for such behavior. 68
What are we to make of such cynical uses and abuses of information on the part
of a university, an institution whose president has repeatedly railed against academic
"well poisoning" and inveighed against the tainting of the "free marketplace of
ideas" by "false advertising," "negligence," and the like?69 Beyond its obvious hypoc-
risy, we must conclude that no matter what the institution, if as Lam said, "changing
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the school and the community were the end," then, as realpolitik dictates, the end jus-
tifies the means. In our cynical age this is no revelation; for any of those who still
hold to the ideal that the institutions housing the "free marketplace of ideas" are the
most fit stewards of educational reform, let them be reminded that the structuring
of reform and its regulation or exemption from regulation in the public interest will
ultimately determine the behavior of the reformers.
Boston University came into Chelsea by legislative dispensation as an exception
to the public management of municipal education, specifically in regard to immunity
from the state's "sunshine laws" pertaining to the openness of organizational records
and meetings. As a university it has not chosen to evaluate its own performance. It
and its functionaries have distorted the findings of a study carried out under its aus-
pices to determine parents' sentiments about the Chelsea schools and other educa-
tional matters. These betoken an important social fact: institutions that are allowed
to evade the norms governing the use of information important to the public welfare
can be expected to disclaim those norms only when they interfere with its private
aims and agendas. Moreover, such behavior bespeaks the kind of blurring of bounda-
ries between the public and private spheres that students of privatization have warned
us about. Hence, the kind of fuzziness and sleight of hand involved in the definition
of the Institute for Responsive Education as "autonomous," when clearly it and its
director's behavior and role at best represent a conflict of interest, are to be ex-
pected when a dangerous muddling of boundaries between public and private inter-
ests occurs.
Privatization Is Not Partnership
At a March 2, 1991, talk before the National Education Association Higher Educa-
tion Conference, Marta Rosa characterized Boston University's management of Chel-
sea's schools as an "arranged marriage." Others, suggesting that "the proper role of a
major university would be to offer to direct its resources ... in an open accountable
manner," have called it a "leveraged buyout. The residents of Chelsea feel 'taken
over.'"70 Rosa asserted, "My greatest criticism of the project is that there is a lack of
understanding on the part of BU of the culture of the community." She reported that
her constituents feel ignored, frustrated, and apprehensive and are confused over the
roles of parents in the project. Criticizing the management team's eagerness to score
public relations points in the name of hastily conceived programs, she asked, "Is this
so-called partnership empowering the community? Is it addressing the causes of the
downfall of public education in urban communities?"71
Here the literature on educational partnerships is instructive. Those partnerships
between universities and school systems which work best eschew corporate models,
hierarchical and elitist arrangements, and favor participational/egalitarian ones. 72,73
An appraisal of university-public school partnerships categorizing these arrange-
ments into three models — university control, allied elite, and participational — fits
the Chelsea project into the first, university control, and concludes, after examining
this conflict-ridden arrangement, "While we vigorously applaud Boston University's
vision, boldness, and comprehensiveness, we have several concerns about the appro-
priateness and feasibility of the Chelsea Project — especially as a model for other
universities to emulate." Their concerns "are directed primarily toward the style of
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the reform — the structuring of roles and relationships of the Chelsea Project,"
which in the context of a "privatized . . . urban school district ... is expert-driven,
unidimensional, and only marginally participatory." 74 Finally,
There is persuasive documentary evidence . . . that the University has exacerbated
the tensions that would normally be expected in the kind of change proposed for
Chelsea. Rather than build alliances with teachers, administrators, and parents,
Boston University officials have ignored the concerns of these groups at critical
junctures, eschewed their participation in significant planning and decision-
making, imposed the University's agenda as a set of non-negotiable demands,
and reacted indignantly to criticism from these quarters. 75
It has been suggested that school reform might be a proxy for societal reform. The
recurrence of educational reform often reflects "economic instability, shifts in popula-
tion, and social change [which] uncover[s] tensions." Media and other groups "trans-
late the unrest into recommended policies for schools to enact." 76 Social concerns
"overflow" during times of economic and social crisis into the most vulnerable
institutions capable of eliciting the appearance of change — schools. No matter that
educational institutions cannot by themselves solve or resolve social, political, and
economic problems; these socializing institutions become the screens for our pro-
jected fantasies of how we would like to have grown up and for how we wish society
to work — mock societal reform!
On the other hand, when minorities and the poor struggle in the educational arena
for their communities' educational rights, reform holds real promise, because the
struggle for schooling is central to bringing minorities together "as a group with par-
ticular political demands and a distinct history of political practice centered around
education issues."77 In Chelsea, educational privatization catalyzed a community
struggle whose educational horizons have transcended the narrow and self-serving
designs of the privatizers.
It is tempting to portray Boston University merely as a villain, but it is more
fruitful to understand events in Chelsea as a struggle against privatization. In im-
pugning the legitimacy of the Hispanic Commission and casting aspersions on the
political purity of Marta Rosa's election, the management team is enacting an erst-
while scenario of privatization: discrediting the public sphere78 and substituting, that
is, inverting the inviolability of one realm, the public, by another, the private. In this
case, the public forum as well as public service is discredited institutionally and ideo-
logically. This can be done openly through discrediting criticism and dissent, or, as
shown earlier in the case of the "Tuning In to Chelsea Parents" study, by blurring the
two realms. 79
A 1991 essay on the privatization controversy adds to the familiar list of attributes
most often cited by the promoters of privatization — cost effectiveness, efficiency,
and choice — the criteria of accountability, empowerment, and legitimacy. The essay
suggests that "citizens have the opportunity to control their own destiny by making
decisions that affect their lives" (empowerment), that provision be made for periodic
review by voters (accountability), and that citizens believe the decision-making proc-
esses under privatization are fair (legitimacy). 80
Boston University has satisfied none of these criteria. Noting that "privatization
leads to loss of control and a decline of citizen participation in government," Al Bilik
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identifies the Chelsea project, and the contract wherein Boston University has sought
immunity from state laws requiring open meetings and public records, as a quintes-
sential evasion of democratic accountability. 81
In this connection, we may view the university's strategy as follows: (1) to main-
tain primacy in public opinion and mass communications by privatizing public opin-
ion, that is, pressuring dissenters to keep their opinions to themselves; (2) to control
information input, public relations output, and public opinion on the project; (3) to
redefine ideologically the standards of proper conduct of individuals and groups, that
is, to redefine civic roles in Chelsea, as expert- (read BU-) driven; and (4) to seek
political advantage in the local and national arenas for the university's dominance
and for Silber's designs on public office. Some of Boston University's tactics look
like sophomoric debating team maneuvers, but with its considerable resources and
sizable public relations machinery, it has controlled the public image of the project.
In attempting to shift the center of gravity for the standard of appropriate individual
and group behavior from the public forum to the private sphere, the university has
sought to arrogate to itself the authority to decide when, where, and how discourse
on public issues shall be framed. However, the university's attempts to vitiate
Latino community empowerment have had the opposite effect of boosting morale
and increasing animosity toward its attempts at defining participational legitimacy
in Chelsea.
The challenge to Chelsea's Latinos is to maintain the momentum in their efforts to
secure self-determination while contending with a myriad of political, economic, and
social forces sweeping through their neighborhoods. On the other hand, were there to
be a real educational partnership in more than words alone, the community's leader-
ship would find itself less besieged by energy-draining combat with a repressive in-
truder and could devote itself solely to the tasks of community building. Nonetheless,
as I have noted elsewhere, combat with an opponent evincing such power, legitimacy,
and acumen has provided this community's civic activists with opportunities and ex-
periences in which new civic roles could be learned, novel social and political stra-
tegies deployed, and new avenues of public discourse explored. 82
The Chelsea experience contains apt lessons for other Latino communities and
may, indeed, provide leads for resistance to the even more massive assaults on the
public weal lying in store for our society as our economy and society steady their
course on chronic recession and purposive erosion of the welfare state.
Addendum
As of May 1994, the basic lineaments of Boston University/Latino community rela-
tions have not changed. In addition, the school issue has been temporarily eclipsed
by governance issues in Chelsea where, at the behest of receiver Harry Spence, a
charter preparation team, within the context of a community process mediated by
outside facilitators, is nearing the end of redrawing the city charter.
Interestingly, a major sticking point has developed over the composition of the
school committee: Chelsea's old-line leadership has opted for it to be elected at-
large; the Young Turks, led by Tito Rosa, are championing a mixed committee of at-
large and district members.
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At the April 25, 1994, convening of the State Oversight Panel, the gallery of
fronts to which spectators have become accustomed materialized again. Of the ap-
proximately forty people in attendance, only fifteen were non-Boston University,
nonschool, or non-school committee personnel. With a $94 million school building
program to dangle before the public, Boston University presented all the trappings it
could muster — architect's drawings, building-use plans, and a veneer of fashionable
educational bric-a-brac adorning the projected curriculum ("ideas by Sizer . . . small
is better . . . schools within a school . . . a job-skill-specific program").
Just as we thought that the latest version of CEAC (Chelsea Executive Advisory
Committee to the BU management team) was a dead duck, out popped a new, resur-
rected group with a revamped roster including mostly new members — only two
from the previous version remain — all "self-selected" according to management
team member Robert Sperber. Panel members were given a five-page outline of
"CEAC II" setting forth its goals, objectives, organizational structure, and constituent
roles. This body, now dubbed the Chelsea Education Advisory Council, is ready to
make another try at democratic community input into BU-led educational policy-
making and administration. I am not putting my money on this apparition's being a
phoenix; it will more likely be a zombie!
At the meeting the Bilingual Parents Advisory Committee presented its list of
grievances, underscoring their weariness at having to do so repeatedly. It included
nonexistence of a bilingual special education program, a still-vacant bilingual direc-
tor's post, the mandate to forbid students from speaking Spanish in the schools, the
lack of vocational programs — for a suit is pending against the Chelsea schools —
the charade of parental and community involvement in the hiring process, particu-
larly when candidates of color are screened (the typical response has been that there
are insufficient qualified candidates), demeaning treatment of Latino students, the su-
per-intendent's use of meetings as stalling tactics, and so on. The panel's yearly re-
port on this so-called partnership is due to appear. It will be interesting to hear their
verdict on yet another year of dismal community relations.
The university's Second Report to the Legislature (September 1, 1993) announced
"modest improvements in [standardized] test scores." A glance at Massachusetts
Department of Education printouts of scores and changes for 1988, 1990, and 1992
indeed confirms that changes are modest at best. A perusal of figures for Lawrence, a
larger city with a similar ethnic profile and demographics and a Latino community of
comparable longevity, presents a similar picture. Since Lawrence has not undergone
school "reform," what are Chelsea parents to make of this? Is it the best they can
expect of this "partnership"?
Boston University maintains that the abysmal performance of the twelfth grade is
to be expected, considering that the older students have not had the benefit of the
much publicized preschool program. The university contends that dramatically im-
proved scores await the end of its ten-year contractual tenure in Chelsea, when more
age cohorts will have reaped the benefits of the reformed school system, which is
special pleading. To argue that horrid high school scores are due to high transiency is
to deny responsibility for the education of older children.
The issue is a bone of contention between the Latino parents and Boston Uni-
versity. It has been galling for the parents to hear the management team defend
inordinate budget allocations for the preschool program at the expense of resources
for the upper grades as a necessary sacrifice. Must they await the end of the univer-
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sity's allotted time in Chelsea before reaping the benefits of its already questionable
praxis? In the meantime, captive students and their parents must endure mediocre
educational performance and abusive community relations.
Significantly, the sole attempt at evaluation of the project, indicated in the current
legislative report, is the university's proposed engagement of an evaluator of the
standardized test scores.
Chelsea Latinos continue to plug away at improvement of their lot. Chelsea's Com-
mission on Hispanic Affairs has launched an economic development initiative and is
securing funding for a Small Business Resource Center in addition to nurturing a
flourishing Hispanic Business Association, which has celebrated its first anniversary.
The commission, in partnership with the Gaston Institute for Latino Public Policy at
the University of Massachusetts, has undertaken a leadership education project com-
prising small business workshops and skill development of community activists, busi-
nesspeople, and professionals. Its economic development work is a cornerstone for
the Gaston Institute's state-funded Latino Business Development Center serving com-
munities throughout Massachusetts. The commission, which supports and advises a
tenants association and the Bilingual Parents Association, is guiding the development
of a housing collaborative to develop affordable housing in Chelsea.
One marvels at the contrast between the stasis defining the relationship between
the forces of the university and Chelsea's plain folks and the resourcefulness and ver-
satility of the latter as they strive to expand the theater within which they can trans-
form their world amid their allotted adverse social and economic conditions. **
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"I submit we have the school system we want. But even if
we can Y change schools, we still may be able to change
education.
"
— Dale Mann
208
